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No MORE VIETNAMS?: THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN Poucv. Edited by Richard M. Pfeffer. New York: Harper
& Row. 1968. Pp. x, 299. $5.95.
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LA.w. Sponsored by
the American Society of International Law. Edited by Richard A.
Falk. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1968. Pp. ix, 633.
Cloth, $15; Paper, $3.95.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WoRLD POWER. By Gale W. McGee.
Washington, D.C.: The National Press. 1968. Pp. ix, 274. $6.95.
BEYOND VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND AsIA. By Edwin
0. Reischauer. New York: Knopf. 1967. Pp. 242. Cloth, $4.95; Paper,
$1.65.
A review of the current Vietnam literature1 indicates a striking
lack of agreement about the pertinent facts of the conflict. There
are a variety of divergent views, for example, on the nature and
1, For a selected bibliography, see THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC !NsrrrUTIONs, VIETNAM: MATTERS FOR THE AGENDA 62-64 (Center Occasional Paper No. 4,
June 1968); D. DUNCANSON, GOVERNMENT AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM 421-32 (1968);
G. Kl.HIN 8: J. LEwxs, THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM 446-54 (l!l67). THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL I.Aw (R. Falk ed. 1968) contains representative writing on the international law aspects of the conflict. In addition, see R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1968); W. BURCHETT, VIETNAM
WILL WIN (1969); N. CHOMSKY, AMERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS (1969); R.
CRITCHFIELD, THE LONG CHARADE (1968); V. GIAP, BIG VICTORY, GREAT TASK (1968); E.
GRUENING 8: H. BEASER, VIETNAM FOLLY (1968); w. Jusr, To WHAT END (1968); D. KRAS·
LOW 8: S. LOORY, THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM (1968); W. LEDERER, OUR
OWN WORST ENEMY (1968); THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM (C. Beal ed. 1968); D. SCHOEN·
DRUN, VIETNAM (1968); R. SHAPLEN, TIME OUT OF HAND (1969); SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELAUONS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK ON A
STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM (Comm. Print 1968); VIETNAM: ISSUES AND ALTERNA·
nvES (W. Isard ed. 1969); R. WHITE, NonODY WANTED WAR (1968); Fleming, Vietnam
and After, 21 W. POL. Q. 141 (1968); Hannan, A Political Settlement for Vietnam:
The 1951 Geneva Conference and Its Current Implications, 8 VA. J. INTL. L. 4 (1967);
Kissinger, The Viet Nam Negotiations, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 211 (1969); Murphy, Vietnam: A Study of Law and Politics, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (1968); Robertson, The
Debate Among American International Lawyers About the Vietnam War, 46 TEXAS L.
REv. 898 (1968); Schick, Some Reflections on the Legal Controversies Concerning
America's Involvement in Vietnam, 17 INTL. 8: CoMP. L.Q. 953 (1968).
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magnitude of the insurgency in South Vietnam; the nature, scope,
and timing of Communist aggression from the North; and the extent of the representative character of the Saigon regimes. Perhaps
equally significant is the widespread and indiscriminate use of
rhetoric such as the "U.S. commitment in South Vietnam" and the
"U.S. stake in Southeast Asia"-terms which comprise a hodgepodge of goals, policies, and prescriptions. Other concepts, such
as self-defense, aggression, and self-determination, are highly ambiguous, and have successfuly defied any universally accepted definition as to their content.2 Moreover, this vague terminology
tends to obscure important facts. A combination of divergent views
of the facts and excessive use of rhetoric is likely to result in conflicting and perhaps misleading interpretations and conclusions. Since
the Vietnam conflict has evoked strong emotional responses in the
United States, there is an immense risk that a writer's normative
perspectives will inadvertently, or perhaps even knowingly, so influence his selection and interpretation of the facts and of the
applicable legal principles as not only to hamper objective reporting,
but also to stifle scholarly criticism and evaluation.3 Meanwhile,
the growing mass of Vietnam literature has already reached the
point at which the average person is inundated with divergent anal·
yses of the war. He follows -events, if at all, by merely glancing
through the labyrinth of daily news reports; indeed, he does that
only as a result of a well-developed sense of duty. One of the first
casualties of war is said to be truth, and the Vietnam situation is
hardly an exception. 4
Nevertheless, several books and articles seem to stand out from
the fog surrounding the Vietnam literature. Selected for review here
are four such studies. They present the main political and legal argu2. See, e.g., D. BOWEIT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); I. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); R. EMERSON, SELF•
DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION (Harv. Univ. Center for Intl.
Affairs, Occasional Papers in Intl. Affairs No. 9, Dec. 1964); H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETER:mNATION WlTHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS (1967); :M:. M®OUOAL &: F. FEUCIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WoRLD PUBUO ORDER (1961): s. PossONY, AGGRESSION AND SELF·
DEFENSE: THE LEGALITY OF U.S. ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM: (Univ. of Pa. Foreign Policy
Research Institute, Monograph Series No. 6, 1966); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WoRLI)
ORDER (1958); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression,
23 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item No. 86, U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1 (1968); Hazard, Why
Try Again To Define Aggression?, 62 A11r. J. INTL. L. 701 (1968); Panel: Problems of SelfDetermination and Political Rights in the Developing Countries, 60 PROC. AM. SocY.
INTL. L. 129-50 (1966).
3. See, e.g., notes 56-60, 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
4. U.N. Secretary General U Thant remarked at a press conference on February 24,
1965: "I am sure the great American people, if only they knew the true facts and the
background towards the development in South Vietnam, will agree with me that
further bloodshed is ••• unnecessary ••• ," reprinted in LAWYERS COMM. ON
AMERICAN Poucy TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1967). See
generally D. KRASLO\V 8: s. LOORY, THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM (1968);
J. GOULDEN, TRUTH Is THE FIRST CASUALTY (1969).
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ments that have been made with regard to the Vietnam. conflict and
they elucidate the various approaches which have been taken in the
continuing debate on Vietnam. 5 No Afore Vietnams?, 6 edited by
Richard Pfeffer,7 is the product of a conference which took place
in Chicago in the summer of 1968 under the auspices of the Adlai
Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. The twenty-six conferees included eminent scholars, current and former government
officials, and journalists.8 In their dialogue, they present a candid
evaluation of the causes that led to American involvement in Vietnam0-the national traits of the United States, the bureaucratic inertia, and the misconceptions about Asia in general and about Vietnam
in particular. In addition, they frankly inquire into the nature and
suitability of the strategies used by the United States in the prosecution of the war,1° and they appraise American foreign policy in
view of the Vietnam. "fiasco."11
The Vietnam War and International Law12 is a collection of
articles and documents discussing legal aspects of the Vietnam. conflict; it was sponsored by the American Society of International Law,
and was edited by Richard Falk,13 a distinguished international
lawyer. The expressed views range from an unqualified defense
of the legality of the United States role in Vietnam, 14 to an equally
vehement denunciation of the American position as illegal.15
The Responsibilities of World Power16 and Beyond Vietnam 11
are two representative works by persons closely associated with the
Washington scene. In the first, Senator Gale McGee18 presents an
5. These studies were selected for review from scores of books the reviewer used in
teaching a recent Jaw school course at the University of Denver entitled, "Legal and
Political Issues in the Vietnam War."
6. No MORE VIETNAMS? (R. Pfeffer ed. 1968) [hereinafter No MoRE VIETNAMs?].
7. Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute and Research Fellow in Comparative Law
at the University of Chicago Law School.
8. Among the conferees were Henry Kissinger, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hans
Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman, John McDermott, John King Fairbank, Theodore
Draper, Edwin O. Reischauer, Samuel P. Huntington, James C. Thomson, Richard
J. Barnet, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Sir Robert Thompson.
9, No MORE VIETNAMS? 1-114.
10. Id. at 115-88.
11. Id. at 189-288. Stanley Hoffman and Edwin Reischauer both use the term
"fiasco." Id. at 5 and 269 respectively.
12. THE VIETNAM WAR A.ND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1968) [hereinafter
VIETNAM WAR].

Ill. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practices, Princeton University.
14. See articles by John Moore, in VIETNAM WAR 237, 303, 401; Leonard Meeker,
id. at !118; statement by Dean Rusk, id. at 335.
15. See articles by Quincy Wright, id. at 271; Wolfgang Friedmann, id. at 292;
Richard Falk, id. at 362, 445.
16. G. McGEE, THE REsPONSIBlLITlES OF WORLD POWER (1968) [hereinafter McGEE].
17. E. R.EISCHA.UER, BEYOND VIETNAM (1967) [hereinafter RElsCHA.UERJ.
18. United States Senator from Wyoming.
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·articulate, although occasionally polemical, defense of the Johnson
administration's policies in Vietnam. In the second, Professor Edwin
Reischauer,1 9 an Asia specialist and a former United States Ambassador to Japan, clarifies the issues by presenting the Vietnam
conflict in its broader Asian context. His contribution is particularly
significant because he has been concerned with the problems exemplified by Vietnam for a longer period of time than have most commentators. As early as 1955, he had warned of the danger in his
book, Wanted: An Asian Policy:
... Korea and China both reveal not simply distressing failures of
American foreign policy, but frightening inadequacies in our whole
approach. The United States has been less directly involved in Indochina, but the story has been essentially the same. . . . We have
already tasted in these three countries the bitter fruits of ignorance
and indifference, but Asia contains other potential Chinas, Koreas,
and Indochinas, for which we are today no better prepared than
we were for these earlier disasters ....20

Unfortunately, that warning was not heeded; and the book, unread,
"sank quietly into the sea of library volumes without raising a
ripple." 21
These four works focus upon five major issues of the Vietnam
debate: (1) why and how the United States got involved in Vietnam;
(2) what went wrong with American efforts there; (3) the legality
of the United States role in the Vietnam conflict; (4) the lessons the
United States can learn from the conflict-specifically, the effect it
will have upon the American foreign policy of the future; and (5)
the impact of the conflict on world order.22 These issues are clearly
of major importance to the present and future foreign policy of the
United States; each will be briefly examined in this Review, with
emphasis on the views presented in the selected studies.
19. Professor, Harvard University. United States -Ambassador to Japan, 1961-1966.
20. Cited in R.EisCHAUER 36-37.
21. Id. at 37.
22. Major issues not discussed in these works pertain to the legality of the war
under the United States Constitution, the limits of dissent to the war, the conduct
of hostilities, and moral aspects. See, e.g., CLERGY AND LAYMEN CONCERNED AnoUT
VIETNAM, IN THE NAME OF AMERICA (1968); F. WORMUTH, THE VIETNAM WAR: THE
PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Center Occasional Paper No: 3, April 1968); Faulkner, The War in Vietnam: Is It Constitutional?, 56 GEo. L.J. 1132 (1968); Ferencz, War Crimes Law and the Vietnam War,
17 AM. U. L. REv. 403 (1968); Finman & Macaulay, Freedom To Dissent: The Vietnam
Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 632; Guttman, Protest
Against the Vietnam War, 382 ANNALS 56 (March 1969); Schwartz & McCormack, The
Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEXAS
L. REv. 1033 (1968); Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and
Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REv. 449 (1968).

November 1969]

I.

Recent Books

165

THE UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM
CONFLICT

There is a wide consensus in the Vietnam literature that the
United States initial military involvement in Vietnam can be traced
to Washington's overriding concern with containing an "aggressive"
China, with saving Vietnam and adjoining states from falling as
unwilling prey to "wars of national liberation," and with preventing the development of a situation in Asia which, according to the
United States perception, might threaten its vital national interests. A clear example of this concern can be found in The Responsibilities of World Power, in which Senator McGee stresses the
need to contain the threat of Communist China. McGee, a former
history professor, relies heavily on the history of Europe to supply
guidelines "for American policy in shaping the new history of
Asia." 23 With analogies to the Nazi experience, he argues: "Little
Vietnam and Thailand are just as important [to us] as were Austria
and Poland in the 1930's. To abandon them would hold as grave a
portent for the future as that of the 1930's."24 McGee holds the
United States partly responsible for the devastation of Asia during
World War II and for the subsequent "massive political vacuum"
there,25 and he finds that American participation in the process of
rebuilding Asia has been dictated by two factors-the continuing
national interest of the United States, and a sense of moral obligation.26 He views the United States involvement in Vietnam as a
logical corollary of the policy of containing China and depriving it
of "the raw materials of Southeast Asia." 27 That policy, he says, is
based on the successful program of containing the Soviet Union in
the post-World War II period.28 McGee contends that the reasons
for American involvement in Vietnam can be found in the goal of
"restoring a favorable balance of forces around the world." 29
Reischauer agrees that perhaps the dominant reason for the
United States response was a perception in Washington of a Communist threat in Southeast Asia. He disagrees, however, with the
accuracy of that perception and consequently with the propriety
23. McGEE 20. Although he cautions "against applying the experiences of Europe
to the problems of Asia without careful reservations," he finds "common ingredients
in the politics of both East and West." Id. at 19-20.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 16-19, 49, 51.
27. Id. at 23. See also id. at 22, 49, 226.
28. Id. at 11, 12, 21, 22.
29. Id. at 25. See also id. at 19.
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of the United States response. American policy in Asia, he believes,
was based on "hasty analogies drawn from other times and other
places ... in the confused early posnvar years, or under the psychological Stresses of the cold war."30 In his opinion, such analogies
between Asia and Europe, especially those which dictate an attempt to contain communism by entering into bilateral defense
treaties, are fundamentally false. 31 Thus, he strongly challenges
McGee's contention that the United States presence in Vietnam reflects an appropriate response based on considerations of the balance
of power in Asia. Indeed, Reischauer considers it "perhaps our greatest mistake" to assume that the power balance in Asia was comparable to that which existed in Europe.82 As distinguishing features,
he recounts the Sino-Soviet rift, the costs to China or Russia of
military conquest or political domination of the Asian lands, especially the burdens which would be placed on their economies if communism were to spread in Asia, and the forces of nationalism on that
continent. 33
The remarks by a large majority of the conferees in No More
Vietnams? are generally in agreement with Reischauer's position.
They seek to expose the misconceptions underlying the United States
Vietnam involvement. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for example, explains the United States readiness to undertake intervention in Vietnam in terms of an historical framework comprised of two strains in
American thinking about the United States role in the worldthe idea of collective security, and the concept of "liberal evangelism'; expressed through "a kind of global. New Dealism." He concludes that that intervention "in the end, bore no relationship to
any rational assessment of our interest." 34 Adam Yarmolinsky holds
three factors responsible for the United States decision to give assistance to the Diem regime: anti-communist solidarity; concern
about the Chinese domination of Southeast Asia; and fear that a
shift in the loci of the iron and bamboo curtains would result if
Communist military force were not met. 36 James C. Thomson attributes the early decisions about Vietnam to the legacy of the
1950's-the "loss of China," the Korean War, and the Far East
policy of Secretary Dulles which gave rise to the domino theory
about Asia.36 Henry Kissinger focuses on "lack of historical know!30. R.ElsCHAUER 98. See also Reischauer in No MoRE VIETNAMS? 114.
31. R.EiscHAuER 57-60. He admits, however, that "our efforts to give security to
weak Asian states through SEATO and other alliances was [sic] well motivated and may
have had some efficacy." Id. at 97.
32. Id. at 92.
33. Id. at 92-96.
34. No MORE VIEl'NAMS? 7-8.
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 20.
The new Administration inherited and to some extent shared the "domino
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edge": "[I]t is amazing that no one seems to have systematically
studied, before we went there, what the French experience was in
Vietnam .... [and] why we thought we could achieve with sixteen
thousand men what the French could not do with two hundred thousand men." 37 Theodore Draper places partial responsibility for
intervention on "the doctrine of 'limited war' as it was worked
out in the latter half of the 1950's outside the government and
taken over by the government in the 1960's."38 Several others, including Richard J. Barnet, discuss the impact of the failure of the
American political and bureaucratic decision-making processes upon
the United States initial involvement in Vietnam.39
The thesis that concern with China led the United States to
Vietnam is also supported by Quentin L. Quade, in The Vietnam
War and International Law.40 Quade attempts a thorough analysis of American response to wars of national liberation, and finds
that responsibility for the involvement in Vietnam lies in the
United States perception of a future continuing struggle with
China.41
Thus, there is an apparent agreement among the political analysts that the United States foresaw a direct threat from China or
an indirect threat from the Southeast Asian activities of a worldwide Communist conspiracy. That consensus, however, should not
obscure the marked divergence of views as to the accuracy of that
perception and as to the fitness of the United States response.
II.

THE UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

No More Vietnams? offers a brilliant analysis of the United
States problems in Vietnam. 42 Leading the discussion, Stanley Hoffman identifies as the United States hubris, its "old 'illusion of
omnipotence.' " 43 He believes that this illusion, coupled with the
United States misreading of reality and its ignorance of the context,
has resulted in the present morass. It has led, for example, to the
theory" about Asia. This theory resulted from profound ignorance of Asian history
and hence ignorance of the radical differences among Asian nations and societies.
It resulted from a blindness to the power and resilience of Asian nationalisms.
(It may also have resulted from a subconscious sense that since "all Asians look
alike,'' all Asian nations will act alike.) As a theory, the domino fallacy was not
merely inaccurate but also insulting to Asian nations; yet it has continued to this
day to beguile men who should know better.
Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 26.
39. See Barnet, id. at 50-74, 90-96; Thomson, id. at 44-50; Wohlstetter, id. at 74-83;
Yarmolinsky, id. at 102-08.
40. VIETNAM WAR 102.
41. Id. at 110.
42. No MoRE VIETNAMS? 115-88.
43. Id. at 121.
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deployment of massive conventional war machinery to cope with an
insurgency situation, and it has encouraged efforts to build "someone else's nation, to [create] a stable society and polity elsewhere,
in the midst of a large-scale war." 44 That same hubris, moreover,
has caused an Americanization of the war, thereby providing the
insurgents with a cause, and has "brought not merely physical but
social destruction to the people we came to protect."45 Sir Robert
Thompson, who guided the successful campaign against guerrillas
in Malaya, concurs in part: "The wrong definition of the original
threat (the Korea complex) and the building of too large and conventional an army to meet it, were the beginning of the tragedy." 46
But Thompson offers a remedy for similar situations in the future.
His over-all strategy for a Vietnam-type intervention would be to
assign a top priority to the task of nation building and then to
follow that with pacification and, finally, with destruction of the
enemy forces. He considers the major weakness of the United States
strategy to be a reversal of priorities.47 In addition, he finds that
the current situation lacks the basic prerequisites for a successful
prosecution of the intervention strategy-effective organizational
machinery and the control necessary to implement the strategy.
Thus, he places a large part of the blame for the failure of the
United States policy on administrative problems-specifically, on
the lack of a good working relationship between the United States
and the government of South Vietnam, and on the latter's incompetence in governing.48 As a solution to the latter problem, he
recommends an effort by the United States to strengthen the administrative capabilities of the host country's government by training,
policing, improving communications and intelligence systems, introducing an equitable taxation system, and developing an economic
assistance program.
Taking issue with Thompson, John McDermott argues that the
existing social and political conditions in Vietnam were such that
success was not possible for the American strategy under any circumstances. It is McDermott's position that even if Thompson's
prescription for strengthening the governing capacity in the host
country had been faithfully implemented in South Vietnam, the
United States aim of nation-building in that country would still
have failed. 49
44. Id. at 130.
45. Id. at 134. See also s. HOFFMAN, GULLIVER'S TROUBLES 176-213 (1965).
46. No MoRE V.lfil'NAMs? 156. See id. at 154-71 for all of Thompson's arguments.
47. Id. at 157-58.
48. Id. at 158-62.
49. Id. at 171-79. See also id. at 244-45.
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In The Responsibilities of World Power, Senator McGee blames
the setbacks to the Vietnam policy on the United States failure to
react quickly to meet Hanoi's military escalation in 1963 and 1964.
In his opinion, the United States miscalculations, "mistakes, if you
prefer," 110 were errors in timing and in shifting tactics. Such errors,
he feels, were made by responding directly to the guerrilla warfare,
by failing to recognize the importance of local security forces, and
by asking in 1965, "How many troops will it take not to lose in
the south?" when the question should have been, "How many
troops will be needed to win?" 51 Thus, he identifies the United
States mistakes in tactical terms. 52 To that kind of analysis, William
R. Polk responds in No Afore Vietnams?:
It seems to me that as a rough rule of thumb one can say that something like 80 per cent of the process of guerrilla warfare is political,
15 per cent administrative, and only 5 per cent military. Applying
this scale to the Vietnamese conflict, one can say that the political
issue was largely decided as early as 1946, and the administrative issue
by about 1957, and that we are talking today only about the residual
5 per cent. 53

This dialogue enhances one's awareness and appreciation of
the complicated nature of the problem, and is likely to stimulate
further inquiry into important questions concerning the order of
priorities for an intervening nation, the proper role of a foreign
power in "nation-building," and the purpose of foreign aid. In addition, it raises the problem whether the policy of incrementalism
is as unfit to meet guerrilla warfare as is the policy of massive retaliation, especially when the insurgency is substantially indigenous.
Finally, the difference of opinion over the United States strategy
in Vietnam demonstrates the vital need that the total strategy and
tactics of the intervening state be coordinated to conform to its
overriding policy objective. To do this, the intervening nation must
insure itself built-in flexibility, so that it has several options available at any given stage of the conflict, thus avoiding the situation
in which strategy begins to dictate policy and to drag policy-makers
into unforeseen traps. The method for creating this necessary flexibility, however, is not readily apparent.

III.

LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE CONFLICT

What greets a reader at the threshold of examining the legality
of the United States activities in Vietnam is a state of utter con50,
51.
52.
53.

McGEE 251.
Id. at 249 (emphasis deleted).
Id. at 239-55.
No MoRE VIEI'NAMS? 184.
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fusion. This derives, at least in part, from the inability of the traditioll-al concepts of international law54 to provide a framework
within which a Vie,t:n.am-like sitqation can be identified, discussed,
and resolved. Another, and equally formidable, handicap which is
partially responsible for this undesirable situation is the lack of an
impartial fact-finding apparatus in the international arena. Moreover, the United Nations Charter and various other international
agreements, including the 1954 Geneva Accords, are susceptible of
varying interpretations. That factor, combined with the decentralized nature of the world community and the weaknesses which
attend its ideological orientation, relegates juridical considerations
to a secondary position. Law is still relevant, it can be argued; but
in view of the power-oriented, ideological structure of the international society, other considerations, mainly political and eco•
nomic, must dictate policies.55 Thus, it should come as no surprise
that the ranks of international lawyers are deeply split on the issue
of the legality of the United States actions in Vietnam. Their
writings show that they are polarized into clashing positions-either
as staunch defenders or as equally staunch critics of the United
States role in Vietnam.
This polarization can easily be seen by comparing The Legality
of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 156 a memorandum from the Legal Advisor of the United States Department
of State, with the major criticism of that work. The memorandum
altogether ignores the legal arguments that might weaken the assertion that the United States is lawfully in Vietnam and confines
its discussion to the selection and interpretation of facts and law
most favorable to the American position. Thus, it seems to have
invited the comment that it is merely an exercise in rationalizing
and justifying an existing government position, and therefore does
not qualify as an objective legal assessment of the situation. 57 However, the major study criticising the memorandum on that score,
Vietnam and International Law,r;s itself suffers from a similar ad54. See, e.g., w. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 745-51 (reprisals), 751-54 (intervention), 776-79 (self-defense), 274 (self-determination) (2d ed. 1962).
55. See, e.g., Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INTL. L.
750, 769 (1966), in VIETNAM WAR 271, 290.
56. The Memorandum of March 4, 1966, is reprinted in 112 CoNG. REc. 5504 (1966),
60 AM. J. INTL. L. 565 (1966), and VIETNAM WAR 583. An earlier U.S. Department of
State Memorandum of March 8, 1965, Legal Basis for United States Actions Against
North Viet-Nam, was reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE CoM?.r. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89TH
CONG., 2o SESS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST AsIA AND VIETNAM
199 (Comm. Print 2d rev. ed. 1966).
57. See Falk, Preface to LAWYERS COMM. ON .AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, VlETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1967).
58. LAWYERS COMM. ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). See also LAWYERS COMM. ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS
VlETNAM, AMERICAN PoucY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, MEMORANDUM OF LAW, reproduced in
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versary perspective. Indeed, its fact selection process and its arguments give it the appearance of a prosecutor's brief. But those are not
the only one-sided works. Other studies, notably Law and Vietnam, 159
and The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam, 60 also appear to be stout efforts at providing an all-out
defense for the United States position, and are therefore unreliable
appraisals.
The Vietnam War and International Law offers a stimulating
discussion among American international lawyers, even though the
conceptual framework is mainly based on untrustworthy 61 traditional doctrines. In Part I, 62 articles by numerous professors63 and
excerpts from Emmerich de Vattel and John Stuart Mill deal with
the broad issues of internal conflict and intervention, thus providing an ideal setting for Parts II and III, which contain inquiries into
the legal issues of the Vietnam War. 64 Those inquiries are then
made in selections from Eliot Hawkins, from Leonard Meeker, formerly the Legal Advisor to the United States Department of State,
and from many noted professors of international law. 65
The legal arguments which appear in these studies have a wide
range, but all are based on the same set of customary international
law norms. Those norms pertain to aggression, self-defense, the general treaty law respecting the breach of agreements, the requirements of necessity and proportionality in the use of force, and the
requirements for statehood. Also invoked occasionally are the United
Nations Charter, the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the SEATO Treaty.
Despite their reliance on the same general principles, however, the
international lawyers come to conflicting conclusions. That conflict
may be traced to their disagreement on issues of mixed fact and
112 CONG. REC. 2666 (1966); Declaration of World Conference of Lawyers for Vietnam,
Grenoble, July 6-10, 1968.
59. R. HULL &: J. NovooRAD, LAW AND VIETNAM (1968).
60. Moore &: Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam, 5 DUQUESNE U. L. R.Ev. 235 (1967) (in collaboration with Myres McDougal),
reprinted in 112 CoNG. REc. 15,519 (1966). See also Deutsch, Legality of the War in
Vietnam, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 153 (1968).
61. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
62. VIETNAM WAR 17-159.
63. Those professors are Manfred Halpern, Professor of Politics, Princeton University; William T. Burke, Professor of Law, Ohio State University; Quentin L. Quade,
Professor of Political Science, Marquette University; ,valt ,v. Rostow, Professor of
Economics and History, University of Texas, former Special Assistant to the President;
and Wolfgang Friedmann, Professor of Law, Columbia University.
61. See VIETNAM WAR 163-522.
65. These are Quincy Wright, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Chicago;
Wolfgang Friedmann; Richard A. Falk; John N. Moore, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Virginia; Daniel G. Parton, Professor of Law, Boston University; Neill
H. Alford, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia; and Tom J. Farer, Assistant
Professor of Law, Columbia University.
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law. The most important of these issues is whether Vietnam is a political entity; that is, whether it qualifies as a separate state, and if it
does, on what date it achieved that status. One's feeling about this
matter has some effect on his position as to whether the conflict is a
civil war, an international conflict, or both. I£ it is thought to combine elements of both, there is further disagreement about whether
the conflict was originally indigenous, or whether it was of extraneous instigation, assistance, and control; and about the time and
source of the military assistance received by both the incumbents
and the insurgents. The lawyers also differ about the kind of reprisals still permissible under international law. Since the United
States collective self-defense measures are claimed to have been
undertaken in response to the alleged armed attack from the North,
one's stand on the validity of those measures depends upon whether,
in his belief, the North Vietnamese actions of infiltration and subversion constituted armed attack as defined in the United Nations
Charter. A final area of disagreement concerns the basis of the 1954
Geneva Accords, who is bound by them, and how they should be
interpreted, particularly with respect to the election provision. A
determination of those factors is important, for one's opinion as to
who has violated the Geneva Accords-North Vietnam, South Vietnam, or the United States-has a significant impact upon his position
as to the legality of the subsequent conduct of each participant.
Perhaps, as Professor Friedmann contends in The Vietnam War
and International Law, disagreement stems in part from the tendency to use international law "as part of the armory of national
policy," 66 and to interpret its norms "so as to conform, in all cases,
with national policy." 67 But it may also reflect a genuine difference
of opinion among reasonable men, based upon scholarly analyses
of the legal issues. 68
In view of the imperfect nature of international law, an impartial determination of these issues is, at present, neither feasible nor
practicable. Nevertheless, there are four major subjects in urgent
need of further inquiry: (1) the problem of fact-finding in a Vietnamtype conflict; 69 (2) the determination of statehood under international
law; 70 (3) the interpretation of international agreements; 71 and (4)
66. VIEI'NAM WAR 294.
67. Id.
68. See Moore, id. at 315.
69. See G.A. Res. 2104, U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 92, 20 U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
For a recent article discussing this problem, see Franclc & Cherkis, The Problem of
Fact-Finding in International Disputes, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1483 (1967).
70. For a recent inquiry, see Comment, Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 857 (1967).
71. M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswELL & J. :MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WoRLD Punuc ORDER (1967) raises and discusses major issues in interpreting agreements.

November 1969]

Recent Books

173

the problem of establishing a set of operative norms, or at least
some policy guidelines, to deal with insurgency situations in which
external participation of varying degrees has already taken place.72
The last of these problems is in particular need of examination and,
if possible, resolution. The customary international law doctrines
of intervention and nonintervention are so vague and so susceptible
of subjective invocation and interpretation that they offer no useful
guidelines in the present context.73 Thus, other standards and solutions must be sought. A distinction might be made, for example,
between the prohibition of military tactical support on the one
hand, and the legitimation of diplomatic, ideological, and economic
strategies on the other.74 In addition, it might be useful to create
typologies of internal conflict, using external involvement and the
indigenous nature of the conflict to determine legal rights and duties
of other parties.71:i
IV.

THE LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

No matter what the eventual outcome of the Paris peace talks,
it is hoped that one salutary effect of the Vietnam conflict will be a
reassessment of the United States foreign policy in general, and of its
policy toward Asia in particular. A re-evaluation of the United States
capabilities and weaknesses in the context of insurgencies should be
another natural consequence of the protracted Vietnam conflict.
Through this reappraisal, the country should examine means of
avoiding future actions leading to undesirable military interventions, while resisting the temptation to lapse into neo-isolationism
as a reaction to a revulsion against the Vietnam experience.76 Assuming that it is possible to achieve both goals, the government should
then determine what guidelines American policymakers must follow
72. The literature on internal conflicts is growing rapidly. For selected recent writing,
see R. BARNET, supra note l; A. CAMPBELL, GUERRILLAS (1968); R. COTTAM, COMPETlTIVE
INTERFERENCE AND TWENTIETH CENTURY DIPLOMACY (1967); THE DIRTY WARS (D. Robinson &: S. Marshall eds. 1968); INTERNATIONAL AsPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 0• Rosenau ed.
1964); R. McCUNTOCK, THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR (1967); L. MILLER, WORLD ORDER
AND LOCAL DISORDER (1967); C. 1\11.'DANS &: S. 1\1'1.'DANS, THE VIOLENT PEACE (1968); J.
PAGET, COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (1967); POUTICS OF VIOLENCE (C. Leiden &:
K. Schmitt eds. 1968); R. THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY, STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY No. 10 (1966).
73. See Burke, VIETNAM WAR 79; Falk, id. at 362, 445; Farer, id. at 509.
74. For elaborate discussion on such a proposal, sec Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARv. L. REv.
!HI (1969).
75. VIETNAM WAR 6-7 suggests this and other possibilities.
76. For expressions of serious concern on this point, sec No MoRE VIETNAMS?
207 (Pool); id. at 216 (Hoffman); id. at 218 (Huntington); id. at 260-61 (Thomson);
id. at 268-70, 283 (Reischauer); id. at 273 (Thompson); McGEE ix; RE!sCHAUER 14-15,
41-42, 99.
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in directing the United States toward a restrained but effective role
of leadership and responsibility in world affairs. 77
The studies under review offer a wide range of prescriptions.
Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, recommends a program of preventive political ihvolvement. 78 Under that program, the purpose
of the United States involvement in a nation displaying a potentially
explosive situation would be to promote political development by
helping the nation to build institutions which are broadly based,
tightly structured, and therefore "capable of channelling discontent
into peaceful paths." 79 He prefers political involvement both to
socio-economic development and to ultimate military intervention,
because political involvement, by its very nature, could "well be
more discreet, less expensive, and more productive of political stability.''80 Huntington also presents practical suggestions as to policies
which the United States could follow to foster political development.81 His basic assumption is that the overriding benefits of the
United States involvement should be the deterrence of overt aggressions and the prevention of domestic insurrections which would
othenvise threaten vital American interests.
Others take issue with Huntington's "essentially technical view
of political development,"82 "welfare imperialism,"83 "culture-centered optimism,"84 and "social [and] political engineering;" 85 and
they view with skepticism the feasibility or desirability of the United
States assuming such a role. But a wide consensus seems to emerge
on several points: the United States should critically re-examine
the limits of its power to shape the world according to its wishes; 86
it should more carefully establish the meaning and priorities of
its national interest; 81 it should distinguish between different types
of intervention; 88 and it should rigorously study any situation before becoming involved in it.89 There is also general agreement that
the United States should adopt a "lower posture in world affairs." 00
77. See No MORE VIETNAMs? 207-08, 214 (Pool); id. at 262-65 (Thomson); id. at 270-71
(Reischauer). See also Reston, Washington: The Turning of the Tide, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1969, at 32, col. 3.
78. See No MORE VIETNAMS? 217-32.
79. Id. at 225. See also id. at 278-80, 284.
80. 1d. at 232.
81. Id. at 231.
82. Id. at 237. See id. at 232-58.
83. Id. at 232. See also id. at 256-57.
84. Id. at 237.
85. Id. at 247, 251.
86. See; e.g., id. at 197-98 (Hoffman), 268 (Reischauer).
87. See, e.g., id. at 198 (Hoffman), 263 (Thomson), 278 (Cooper).
88. See, e.g., id. at 196 (Hoffman), 264 (Thomson).
89. See, e.g., id. at 193-94 (Hoffman), 263-64 (Thomson), 278 (Cooper).
90. Id. at 261 (Thomson).
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Such a posture would not negate coJ;J.cern with the rest of the world
but would indicate a cautious approach to crises, a policy of dise!l-gagement and deactivism,91 and a preference for exploring alternative multilateral measures to meet crises.9 ll
On the other hand, there is a great divergence of views among
the commentators as to the United States role in the specific Asian
context. Senator McGee urges that the country persist in "holding a
firm line" and " 'staying the course' in [Southeast] Asia," 93 while
Edwin Reischauer prescribes a gradual withdrawal as the most desirable course of action, 94 and Hans Morgenthau recommends that
the United States policy "ought to be neither piecemeal military
intervention on the mainland nor disengagement altogether." 95
Reischauer provides the most thorough analysis of the Asian political and economic situation,96 and offers a diagnosis that in Asia
"nationalism is the basic driving force and Communism the technique sometimes adopted to fulfill it." 97 Thus, in his opinion, communism is but one of nationalism's vehicles. Reischauer does not
consider it likely that communism in any form-whether as a global
movement, as Chinese neo-imperialism, o.r as a series of independent
Communist movements-could establish even a temporary hold
over the greater part of non-Communist Asia. 98 But even if all of
Asia were to become Communist-dominated, he feels, there would
be no threat to the United States security.99 He finds that the Communist movements in Asia have thrived primarily on local discontent and that the proper response is as much economic and political
as military. His analysis of the Asian situation leads him to observe
that "our great military power is relatively ineffective in the area." 100
Reischauer suggests a long-range, constructive approach to Asia's
problems instead of a short-range, defensive one. As a first step in
his approach, the United States should come to know and understand Asia better: "In approaching Asia, we are like the proverbial
blind men examining the elephant. " 101 He feels that if the country
91. See id. at 261-67 (Thomson), 268-70, 283 (Reischauer), 273 (Thompson). See also
id. at 232-43 (Ahm2d).
92. See, e.g., id. at 262-66 (Thomson), 271 (Reischauer). But see id. at 285-87
(Wohlstetter).
93. McGEE 269. See id. at 256-69. For his eight concrete suggestions, see id. at 260-67.
McGee's analysis of the Asian political scene and his perception of the American
national interest in Asia seem to suffer from over-generalizations.
94. See RE!SCHAUER 208-12.
95. No MoRE VIETNAM$? 277. See also H. MoRGENTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN PoLlCY FOR
nm UNITED STATES 129-56, 189-206 (1969),
96. RE!sCHAUER 45-99,
97. Id. at 64.
98. Id. at 92-95.
99. Id. at 95-96.
100. Id. at 84.
101. Id. at 45.
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is to avoid future Vietnam quagmires, and if it is to develop the capability to respond adequately to similar situations if they do occur,
it must identify the basic problems in Asia and must rethink
broader Asian policy; 102 only then, in his opinion, can the United
States make wiser choices. Reischauer then offers many concrete
proposals for improving the United States relations, particularly
with Japan103 and China,104 but also for its dealings with the rest
Of Asia,lOIS
V.

IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER

The already fragile world order is likely to be further weakened
if no viable means can be found to regulate the use of force in the
international arena. Promoting and strengthening modalities which
are nonviolent and primarily diplomatic, and encouraging states to
employ those modalities in the pursuit of their national interests
is an imperative of first priority. Yet when a scene of internal conflict becomes a focal point of conflicting ideologies and the conflict
assumes the nature of a holy war, 106 the use of force is often justified
--or rationalized-as a commitment to human dignity,107 a necessary evil to ensure genuine self-determination of peoples,1°8 a fight
102. See id. at 32-42.
103. See id. at 105-39.
104. See id. at 140-80.
105. See id. at 181-212.
106. See U Thant's statement in VDITNAM WAR 344.
107. Murphy, Vietnam: A Study of Law and Politics, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 453
(1968).
Professor Falk makes much of the belief that if national elections were held in the
fifties, Ho Chi Minh probably would have been victorious. Yet if victorious, •••
widespread terror and executions 'in the North during 1955-1956 would very
probably have been repeated throughout the country. Could such actions pass
muster before the conscience of mankind? Surely, at some point, the exigencies of
Mandst history must come under some objective evaluation. Wherein lies the
essential relationship between the person and the state? Does existence have
meaning outside the demands of collective life? What judicial protection against
the state does a commitment to human dignity require? These are not academic
considerations, they bear directly upon the truly human dimensions• of the Vietnam tragedy. [Footnotes omitted.]
Id. at 459.
108. See, e.g., Ambassador Goldberg's statement made at the Plenary Session of the
United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1966: "We seek to assure for the
people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination-to decide its own
political destiny, free of force-that the United Nations Charter affirms for all." Cited
in Deutsch, Legality of the War in Viet Nam, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 153, 160 (1968).
President Johnson's statement, cited by Dean Rusk in VIETNAM WAR 340, is to the
same effect: "(I]f [the North Vietnamese] aggression is stopped, the people and government of South Vietnam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for
supporting American military action there will end." Addressing the twentieth anniversary of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers in Paris on Jan. 20,
1967, I.I. Karpets, Director of the Moscow Institute of Criminology said: "The first
[important task of the association] is to rally all progressive forces to the defense of
the Vietnamese people, who alone are entitled to decide the fate of their country."
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for democracy109 and freedom, 110 or a war of national liberation.111
The following remarks by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
intended to scold international lawyers for their "arrogance" in
trying to analyze in legal terms the 1962 Cuban Quarantine, illustrate that kind of attitude:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a
legal issue. The power, position and prestige of the United States
had been challenged by another state; and law simply does not deal
with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to
the sources of sovereignty.... The survival of states is not a matter
of law.112

Highlighted by this line of reasoning is the crucial issue of the
Vietnam conflict: how can and should the use of force be controlled
in international relations, especially in a situation involving insurgency? When that issue is particularized in the context of the United
States role in Vietnam, the significant question is whether the United
States actions violate international law, or whether they are justified and thereby create a precedent for intervention by a major
power in a small nation tom by internal conflict, especially if the
conflict is aided and inspired by external sources.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Sometime in the future, military historians, political analysts,
and international lawyers might answer a crucial question about the
present conflict: even assuming that the United States aim was to
establish a free and independent Vietnam and thereby to make possible a stable Vietnamese society capable of resisting attempted subversion and aggression,113 was that goal attainable at its outset? In
other words, was victory impossible because of the very nature of the
INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, XXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE

I.A.D.L.: A REPORT .ABOUT THE
Jan. 20, 1967).

CoMMEMORATIVE MEETING AT

UNESCO

HOUSE

24 (Paris:

109. But U Thant stated: "In Vietnam there is growing evidence that the so-called
'fight for democracy' is no longer relevant to the realities of the situation." U Thant's
statement in VIETNAM WAR 247.
110. "The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom
was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson." Dean Rusk's statement in id. at 340.
111. See, e.g., id. at 339 for the following statement by Dean Rusk: "Viet-Nam
presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would
agree with General Giap and other Communists that it is a test case for 'wars of
national liberation.' ,ve intend to meet that test."
112. Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 PRoc. AM. Socy. INTL. L. 13, 14
(1963). See also Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of International Lawyers, 2 INTL. I.Aw. 591 (1968).
!Ill. See Sir Rohen Thompson's remarks in No MoRE VIETNAMS? 156-57.
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conflict,114 or did the United Stat.es fail as a result of faulty strategy,
ill timing, the adoption of ''a mini-brute force policy,"m or ~dminis•
trative and bureaucratic weaknesses?116 The proximity of events
might preclude an authoritative, conclusive determination of this
question at the present time. However, one can gain from the current debate a recognition of the complexity of this multi-faceted problem, and an appreciation of the genuine difference of opinion as to
the reasons for, and priorities of, such interventions. It is encouraging that one can discern in the midst of this morass a willingness
to examine the reasons for the attitudes and events that have shaped
the United States Vietnam policy, and the open-mindedness which
is imperative for pursuing further inquiry into such muddled areas
of law and policy.
Nevertheless, although the inquisitive, scholarly approach in
analyzing such a highly emotional issue as the Vietnam war is
noticeable in the works of several contemporary writers, a critical
appraisal of the Vietnam literature still shows that there are two
urgent needs. The first is to intensify scholarly efforts toward promoting the regulation of force in international relations, and, at the
same time, to explore mechanisms-both old and new-for providing substitutes for the use of force which do not sacrifice effectiveness in the pursuit of national interests. The second need is to
continue the search for clarifying and refining the international law
norms pertaining to the rights and duties of third parties in internalconflii;:t situatiqns.
A look at the Vietnam literature also identifies a glaring gap in
present thinking. That gap is the lack of any significant dialogue
among international lawyers, scholars in political science and
international relations, and policymakers in Washington. The indifference toward international legal norms-"the niceties of international law"-often demonstrated by political scientists who rely
mainly, if not exclusively, upon naked concepts of power and vital
state interests in fomrulating and prescribing national policies,117
works only to frustrate their efforts to build a viable world order.
Equally tenuous are the pretensions of some international lawyers
who surround themselves with a self-created halo of purely juridical
norms. If they pursue their laudable objectives of resolving interstate or intrastate confrontations-which are often highly explosive,
mainly political, and ideologically oriented-without regard to other
fI4, See F •

R. GASTIL, H. KAHN, w. PFAFF &: E. SllLLMAN, CAN WE
(Hudson mstitute Series on National Security and International

.ARMBRUSTER,

WIN 1~ VIETNAM?

Order No. 2, 1968).
ll5. No MORE VIETNAMS? 14Q. See id. at 138-41, 201-02.
ll6. See note 39 supra and accompanying text,
ll7. For a recent formulation by a leading exponent of this thought, see H.
MORGENTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN POUCY FOR THE UNITED STAn:8 111-56, 241-44 (1969).
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disciplines or to pertinent conditioning factors and interactions,
they are doomed to failure.
International law does not operate in a vacuum, and it is not, at
least at present, a panacea for all the ills of the international community. Nonetheless, it has a proper role in providing a framework
of inquiry to clarify goals, policies, strategies, outcomes, and longrange effects.118 Without the interaction between international law
and political science,119 the analysis of a Vietnam-type situation
tends to be sketchy, lopsided, and inadequate.
Ved P. Nanda,
Associate Professor of Law,
University of Denver
ll8. For a thought-provoking statement on the role of international law in the
contemporary world, see McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human
Dignity, 58 PRoc. AM:. SocY. INTI.. L. 107 (1959).
119. For expressions of this concern, see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the
Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. R.Ev.
169 (1968); Polsby, On Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 142 (1968).

